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Abstract
What political factors influence the allocation of economic patronage in democracies?
Answering this question is vital to improving our knowledge of how states and markets
interact. In this paper, I argue that changing levels of party centralization can drive
important changes in the allocation of state largess. When governing parties are
centralized, national party leaders will control sources of patronage, targeting benefits to
particularly influential regions and industries. By contrast, when governing parties are
decentralized, influential sub-national party leaders will advocate for their constituents,
allocating patronage evenly through a national logroll. I find evidence for these
relationships by comparing India’s distribution process for industrial licenses and
government finance under a decentralized Congress Party (1954-61) to its distribution
process under a centralized Congress Party (1969-75).

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Megan Baker-Morin, Richard Doner, John Duffield, Bala Prasad
Erramilli, Jeffrey Hart, Rahul Mukherji, Rashid Naim, Eric Reinhardt, Thomas
Remington, and Shyam Sriram for helpful discussions and comments on drafts of the
paper. I would also like to thank the American Institute for Indian Studies and all of
those in India and the United States who took time to speak with me about the project.
Any errors are mine. Field work for this study was supported by the Emory University
Fund for Internationalization and the Emory University Department of Political Science.

2

What political factors influence the allocation of economic patronage and support
in democracies? In other words, how do we understand which actors benefit from
government largess and which are left in the cold? Answering this question is vital to
improving our knowledge of how states and markets interact around the world. Many
governments intervene heavily in their national economies, making economic patronage
(including such instruments as trade protection, subsidies, government loans, and
industrial licenses) an important driver of outcomes. As scholars of the developmental
state have shown, governments can spur rapid growth through the (economically)
efficient application of support.1 In most countries, however, the allocation of economic
benefits tends to follow a political rather than an economic logic.2
Scholars have advanced a variety of explanations in their efforts to understand
who gets what. Some have suggested that government generosity depends simply on the
influence of the potential recipient. Researchers have proposed, for example, that more
geographically concentrated industries are more likely to receive trade protection.3
Alternatively, some have suggested that industries dominated by a small number of firms
are more effective at soliciting the state than are highly decentralized industries.4 Other
political scientists have highlighted the role played by domestic institutional variation in
aggregating and mediating the demands of aspiring government clients. There is, for
example, evidence that such factors as the structure of electoral systems and the
relationship between executives and legislatures influence the allocation of economic
patronage.5
Despite these important advances, the literature has largely overlooked one
institution that may profoundly influence the distribution of government benefits – the

3

political party. While prior studies have examined the impact of party ideology and party
system on various types of patronage distribution, party organization has mostly fallen by
the scholarly wayside.6 In this article, I hope to help remedy that problem by examining
how changing party centralization drove important changes in the allocation of economic
patronage in India.7
My understanding of party centralization, the component of party organization
that I examine here, takes its cue from the literature on the organizational characteristics
of parties.8 In systems with centralized parties, decision-making is primarily in the hands
of national party leaders. These leaders may head the party organization, hold key
positions in government, or both. Whatever the case, they exercise significant power
over the party apparatus and the party’s elected deputies. Often, the source of this power
is their control over the party name in legislative elections, but other means of leverage
are also possible.
When centralized parties hold the reigns of power, national party leaders will
make the decisions as to which groups receive economic patronage and at what level.9
These national leaders will be in a position to assess how patronage can best be targeted
to achieve their party’s national political goals. As a result, they will distribute economic
benefits to particularly influential and strategic regions and firms. National party leaders
might, for example, target patronage to contested constituencies to firm up their local
support. Sub-national party officials will probably continue to advocate to the party
leadership for patronage in their constituencies, but only those from the more electorally
strategic locales will succeed. Likewise, potential clients in the private sector will
continue to lobby for state aid, but only the more organized and well financed are likely
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to achieve their aims. In systems with centralized parties, therefore, economic patronage
will generally be concentrated in the most influential and strategic industries and regions.
When governing parties are decentralized, numerous sub-national party officials
will have influence over national policy. These officials, by virtue of their smaller
constituencies, will be easier targets for lobbyists than their colleagues running the
national party. As a result, in systems with decentralized parties, patronage will arise
from numerous, independently powerful sub-national officials and party leaders
advocating for industries in their constituencies. This advocacy will generally take the
form of a logroll, with many influential party officials, each associated with particular
clients and constituencies, trading support.
The decentralized nature of the governing party or parties can manifest itself in a
wide variety of ways, depending on the economic policy process of the individual
country. For example, lobbying and logrolls may take place either in party organizations
or in party-dominated legislatures, governments, or bureaucracies. They may be
characterized by classic legislative vote trading, a debate among representatives to a party
organizational meeting, or bargaining among co-partisan national and regional officials.
We can be sure, however, that independently powerful local and regional officials will
demand a role in allocating benefits.
This patronage will tend to be distributed rather evenly among a democracy’s subnational units and firms. The independent power of sub-national officials and
representatives in decentralized parties, along with the logrolling process, will ensure that
few geographical areas are left without support. Indeed, the relatively even spread of
patronage will extend to the smallest geographical or industrial unit that is represented in
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the decentralized policy-making process. Of course, even in a system with decentralized
parties, more strategic regions and firms may be in a better position to demand benefits.
Still, when decentralized parties are in power, I suggest, the distribution of economic
support will be more even than when centralized parties control the government.
I evaluate these arguments with a comparison of India’s experience across two
historical periods in which the centralization of the country’s chief political party, the
Indian National Congress (hereafter the Congress Party or simply the Congress), has
varied. The first period that I examine stretches from 1954 to 1961, and encompasses the
development and execution of the Second Five Year Plan under Jawaharlal Nehru’s
decentralized Congress. The second period, extending from 1969 to 1975, saw the
consolidation of power by Indira Gandhi, her centralization of the Congress Party, and a
strengthening of the government’s role in economic affairs. I use the analysis to evaluate
party centralization and economic patronage distribution in each period and to assess the
causal mechanisms, if any, that have linked the variables together.
My analysis is cross-temporally rather than cross-sectionally comparative and
makes use of a most-similar-systems research design.10 This approach allows me to vary
party centralization while controlling for potentially confounding factors more effectively
than would a cross-national comparison. India in 1954 and India in 1969, while certainly
different, are probably more comparable in most ways than, for example, India in 1969
and Nigeria in 1969. India continued to operate under the same constitution across the
two periods, and such formal institutions as the country’s electoral system and the
relationship between its legislature and executive changed little. Further, the Indian
National Congress held tightly to the reigns of power during both periods, resulting in
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little significant change to India’s party system or to its professed governing ideology.11
What did change was the organization of the Congress Party, which centralized
significantly during the second period. India is therefore an excellent laboratory for
evaluating the effects of party centralization on patronage distribution in a temporally
comparative setting. As most potentially confounding factors are constant across the two
periods, I am able to test the “sufficiency” (although not the “necessity”) of relative party
centralization as an explanation for changes in patronage distribution.

Decentralized Distribution: 1954 – 61
In the years following India’s independence in 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru’s power
base, the Congress Party, transformed itself from a nationalist movement into an
encompassing political party. The Congress Party of the 1950s and early 1960s featured
a decentralized structure in which the preferences of local and state officials were
aggregated into government policy. At the same time, India’s Second Five Year Plan
launched the country on an economic development path based on import substitution and
government direction. While India’s decision to adopt this development path sprang
primarily from the beliefs of its early leaders, party organization played a critical role in
how the strategy was implemented. This section will argue that the decentralized nature
of the Congress Party led to fierce bargaining among influential state and local leaders
over the allocation of economic benefits under the Second Five Year Plan. The
distribution of these benefits was determined through a vast national logroll, leading, I
contend, to an even distribution of industrial licensing and state finance relative to what
would come later. Thus, I argue that the Congress Party’s decentralized structure was a
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key determinant of the distribution of state-funded economic benefits in postindependence India.

The Independent Variable:
The Decentralized Indian National Congress

During the 1950s, the Congress Party sprawled across India’s political scene,
aggregating the views of local and state elites from Punjab to Madras and providing the
country with direction and stability. The party’s decentralization was reflected in, among
other things, the formal party organization. On paper and to a significant extent in
reality, the Congress was a bottom-up organization.12 At the base of the party were the
Mandal Congress Committees (MCCs), largely chosen by the party’s primary members
and responsible for a population of at most 20,000 people. The MCCs played a key role
in electing the party’s next highest unit, the District Congress Committees (DCCs), which
in turn helped select members of the state-level Pradesh Congress Committees (PCCs).
Members of India’s PCCs then elected the president of the party and chose one-eighth of
their number to constitute the national All India Congress Committee (AICC). Finally,
the AICC and the Congress president selected the membership of the party’s most
powerful body, the Congress Working Committee (CWC).
Under Nehru, this organizational structure had real weight, and the national party
leadership, while firmly in control, based its power in the consent of the party’s local and
state units.13 As Weiner famously pointed out in his grassroots study of the party,
Congress dominance was founded not on mobilization but on mediation and broad-based
aggregation.14 The decentralized party structure was a conduit for passing the
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preferences of sub-national elites and, to a lesser extent, the rank-and-file up to the PCCs
and the CWC.15
The Congress’s decentralized structure was also visible in its candidate
nomination procedures.16 When the party sought potential candidates for state and
national elections, it first solicited the views of the Mandal and District Congress
Committees. The state-level Pradesh Congress Committee (or the Pradesh Election
Committee) might, for example, send representatives to constituencies to interview
potential candidates and to speak with MCC and DCC members. Determining the
competitiveness of a potential candidate required a detailed knowledge of factional, caste,
and religious divisions within a constituency, something that could not be evaluated from
New Delhi or even from state capitals.
The views of the Mandal and District party leadership generally weighed heavily
on the decision at the state level. After considering carefully the views of these local
party leaders, the PCC would make candidate recommendations to the Central Election
Committee (CEC). The CEC, drawn from the Congress Working Committee, would then
consider the recommendations and produce the final list of candidates.
In states with fairly stable Congress governments, the CEC generally left the
nomination decision at the Pradesh level.17 When state parties were particularly factionridden and unstable, the CEC would involve itself more deeply in the nomination
procedure. Even then, however, it was a mediator or arbitrator among competing state
factions, not a central organization imposing its will on subordinates.
Clearly, then, the Congress Party under Nehru was a broadly decentralized
organization. Sub-national elites maintained independent power bases in party factions,
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loyal electoral support, local governing councils, and state ministries. Their preferences
were aggregated up through the party apparatus, and the central leadership provided
broad policy guidance while acting as a mediator of local and state interests.

Examining the Causal Linkages:
Did Party Decentralization Drive Economic Patronage Distribution?

Proper functioning of the Second Five Year Plan required significant government
intervention in the Indian economy, with the state taking responsibility for regulating
production (through industrial licenses) and providing finance (through subsidized loans
and grants). The Congress Party’s decentralized structure played a vital role in
determining the administrative processes through which the Indian government allocated
these economic benefits.

Highlighting Causality:
Party Decentralization and Financial Disbursements
One of the most important goals of the Second Five Year Plan was to drive
development in India through massive investment, much of which was earmarked to
establish or grow protected enterprises. Decisions about which regions and industries
would receive the all-important government rupees were the product of a complex, multilevel process.
At the center of this process was the Planning Commission, formed in 1950 and
charged with drawing up the planning documents and overseeing their implementation.
The presence of the prime minister and several key cabinet ministers on the Planning
Commission aimed to ensure that the ambitious national plans would not be ignored.18
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Helping to guide the actions of the Planning Commission was the National
Development Council (NDC), created in 1952 to represent formally the views of India’s
state governments. The NDC comprised the members of the Planning Commission as
well as each of India’s chief ministers, the heads of government in India’s federal states.
The cabinet resolution creating the NDC gave the body such a key role that planning
scholar A. H. Hanson has called it, “an advisory body which could be said to rival the
Planning Commission itself in importance.”19 The NDC served as a forum through
which powerful sub-national elites could influence the plan and push for increased
government outlays to their states.20
The formulation of the Second Plan began as early as 1954, more than two years
before its final adoption. During these early stages, a series of debates were held within
the Planning Commission, the cabinet, and the NDC to develop the broad outline of the
plan. At the same time, state, district, and even village governments were in the process
of formulating their own plans to be incorporated into the national document.21 Indeed,
the planning process in India, while coordinated at the national level, was carried out, to
one degree or another, in cities and villages across the country. While some local plans
were in fact developed by state officials to satisfy New Delhi’s demands for grass roots
involvement, village and district officials often pressured state officials to advocate
projects in their constituencies to the Planning Commission.22
As the village and district plans were being developed, the states were working to
formulate their own plans. Caught between the plan guidelines developed in New Delhi
and the demands of village and district authorities and interest groups, their task was not
a trivial one. The development of state plans and the incorporation of village and district
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plans generally involved a process of lobbying by various powerful interests and
logrolling among state ministries.23 Local elites and demand groups with influence over
state plans traded favors, producing documents full of requests for finance from the
central government. In the state of Andhra Pradesh, for example, a consultative Advisory
Board raised the suggested total money to be spent under the plan from Rs.475 crores to
Rs.482 crores.24
In July 1955, the Planning Commission and the NDC began to consider how the
state plans would be incorporated into the national effort. Thus began a round of
logrolling and negotiation among the state chief ministers, each advocating for the
expansion of protected industries and the provision of finance to his state.25 NDC
meetings were often characterized by vote trading over disbursements under the plan,
creating logrolls among the powerful state politicians.26 Indeed, as a result of these
logrolls, the finance minister called into question the fiscal solvency of the plan in the
NDC. No doubt in a centralized system the financial allocations incorporated into the
plan would have been reduced, but in India’s decentralized system the chief ministers
would have none of it. They blocked the efforts of the finance minister and the Planning
Commission to cut financial outlays under the plan, and at the same time initially refused
to increase taxes.27
While the NDC was working to revise the state and national plans, the powerful
Congress Party organization was holding its own discussions. On August 14, 1955, the
president of the All-India Congress Committee issued a circular to prepare members for a
wide-ranging discussion of the plan:
You perhaps know that the Plan Frame and the question of resources were
discussed by the Standing Committee of the National Development Council on
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which are represented some of the Chief Ministers who are also in their political
capacity our leaders. . . . Our leaders in the government are in a better position to
study these questions. . . . Apart from this, I would not set any limit to
constructive suggestions. . . . Nor would I like to set any limit to suggestions for
the more efficient and economical implementation of the Second Five Year
Plan.28
While the party’s organizational leadership showed a willingness to defer somewhat to
their colleagues in the government, they were still determined to have their say.
Members of the party’s influential governing body brought with them concerns about
how the plan would influence their home villages, cities, and states. These views would
have been aggregated up to the party leadership that controlled the future of the plan.
After seven months of discussions, the NDC approved the Draft Outline of the
Second Plan, and it was published by the Commission. The Draft Outline contained the
Planning Commission’s first official recommendations for the general shape of financial
allocations under the plan. Its release began an even broader national debate over the
details of the plan, a debate carried out in the NDC, the cabinet, the parliament, the
Congress Party, and numerous less official forums. In its explanation of the planning
process, the Commission put it this way:
With the approval of the [National Development] Council, the Draft Outline is
published as a document for the widest public discussion and consideration.
Comments are invited from all sections of opinion. State governments arrange for
the Draft Outline to be discussed at the district level by District Development
Councils and other bodies.29
The central and state governments consulted again with influential local elites and
pressure groups, absorbing their views for the final session of logrolling before the
publication of the plan document.
The national parliament also debated the Draft Outline. As the Planning
Commission put it:
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. . . at the national level, both Houses of Parliament arrange for discussion of the
Draft Outline, first in a general way for a few days at a time, and then in greater
detail through a series of Parliamentary Committees which individual Members
are free to join . . . .30
The Draft Outline of the Second Plan elicited significant interest among the MPs, leading
to additional demands for changes. Member comments ranged from questions about the
broad structure of the plan to concerns over its effects in their constituencies.31
Taking all these views into consideration, the Planning Commission, still working
in consultation with state chief ministers on the NDC, produced the final plan document.
This document represented, at least to some extent, a national consensus over the
distribution of government support under the plan. Even this “final” document was not,
however, final in any true sense, but was subjected to constant review and criticism over
the plan’s five years. The Lok Sabha, India’s lower house of parliament, debated it
several times, and the NDC considered proposed changes, including a dramatic increase
in agricultural production targets. Indeed, the Planning Commission caved to pressure
groups by increasing plan outlays to a number of economic sectors.32 Even a foreign
exchange crunch in 1957 was not enough to reduce expenditures under the plan by more
than Rs. 200 crores.33
The decentralized process of formulating and implementing the Second Five Year
Plan afforded central ministries, state governments, the Congress Party, the parliament,
local elites, and private interests ample opportunities to influence investment targets.
Indeed, the nature of the process accords well with the expectations of the theory. The
development of the plan was characterized by constant lobbying from a multitude of
independently powerful actors, each attempting to ensure that the plan would be as
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beneficial as possible to its interests. As we have seen, a series of logrolls took place
simultaneously at the district, state, and national levels.
How do we know that this decentralized process reflected a decentralized
Congress Party? My argument does not require that the financial allocation process
should be carried out within the political party organization itself. Indeed, while the
Congress Party organization played an important role in the development of the plan,
much of the process took place in the institutions of government. Nevertheless, as these
institutions were dominated by members of the Congress, the structure of the party was
vital to the policy making process. Kothari, for example, has linked the development of
mediating institutions in the party organization with the development of similar
institutions in the state apparatus.34
Even if the administrative process had been centralized on paper, without the
NDC and lacking state and local planning, a decentralized Congress would have ensured
a decentralized plan. When local and state Congress members have independent power
bases, they demand a role in the process, whether formal or informal. On the other hand,
in the presence of a centralized Congress, even an administrative process that was
decentralized on paper would be centrally controlled in reality. District Development
Councils, state advisory bodies, Congress committees, and even the NDC would be
unable to influence the plan if their members were under the thumb of the party
leadership. We shall see the truth of this statement in the next section, which examines
the government of Indira Gandhi.
Because of the Planning Commission’s obligation to respond to independently
powerful elites and interest groups, financial disbursements under the Second Plan were
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distributed relatively evenly by region. It should be emphasized that these disbursements
were sometimes not very balanced in absolute terms, but were balanced relative to
allocations under the centralized system of Indira Gandhi. In the next section, I will
present some basic statistics comparing the geographical distribution of government
finance under Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi.

Highlighting Causality:
Party Decentralization and the Allocation of Industrial Licenses
Government financial outlays were not the only policy instrument of planning
affected by the decentralization of Congress. The process of allocating industrial
licenses, of vital importance in planned economies, also reflected the decentralized
structure of the party. Through the potent mechanism of licensing, government officials
ensured that private firms operated only in those industries reserved for them and that the
country’s scarce resources were devoted to areas prioritized by the plan. Licensing was
also intended to encourage smaller industries, prevent the concentration of ownership,
promote regionally balanced economic development, and ensure the usage of
domestically produced inputs.35
At the center of the industrial licensing process was the inter-ministerial
Licensing Committee. Generally, license applications were first reviewed by relevant
government ministries, which then forwarded those they supported to the committee.
After receiving advice from the Directorate General of Technical Development, the
Licensing Committee made recommendations to the Minister for Industrial Development,
who then made the final decisions. Often, additional committees and government
agencies were involved in the review process.36
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Given the prominent role played by various government ministries, the licensing
process was both decentralized and political from the start. A number of observers,
including the authors of an official Lok Sabha study, have noted the lack of economic
guidelines to inform the decisions of the committee.37 As a result, political pressures
played a significant role in determining who was granted a license and who was not. The
same Lok Sabha study noted that:
It has been stated by the official representative of the Ministry that ‘Quite a
number of States keep on representing that their areas have not received an
adequate share of licenses. I have not got the figures for the number of
representations, but it is a fact that from time to time, Chief Ministers of States
and Industries Ministers of States do write to us pointing out that their States, in
their opinion, have not received a fair share of the licenses.’38
The ministry representative went on the say that the government gave preference to
projects located in underdeveloped areas, but that economic factors were considered first.
A representative from the Planning Commission concurred with this view, but noted that
“there may be other elements like regional considerations which may have to be
introduced in the consideration of particular projects.”39
This anecdote indicates that state officials were not afraid to advocate for the
licensing of projects in their constituencies. Influential businesses also appear to have
applied political pressure to influence the industrial licensing process. Government
ministries often developed clients among interest groups and lobbyists, and very likely
advocated for firms under their purview when referring their applications to the Licensing
Committee.40
The industrial licensing process under Nehru thus accords well with the
expectations of the theory. It was decentralized, and was characterized by powerful state
officials pressuring the central government to grant as many licenses as possible for firms
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and projects in their constituencies. The decentralized structure of the Congress Party, to
which both the central and state leadership almost invariably belonged, ensured that these
requests were often heeded. As a result, while industrial licenses were not distributed
evenly across regions in an absolute sense, they were (as we shall see in the next section)
allocated with more balance under Nehru than under Indira Gandhi.

Centralization and Patronage: 1969 – 1975
Although Indira Gandhi first became India’s prime minister in 1966, it was not
until after the bitter 1969 split in the Congress that she put her indelible mark on the party
and on the nation it represented. She centralized the Congress Party under her direct
control, dispensing with intra-party elections and creating a top-down chain of command.
Moreover, she accelerated the collapse of the Congress System that had aggregated the
preferences of sub-state elites under her father. Gandhi based her support primarily on
populist appeals, and after the 1969 split, she lost control of a large portion of the party
organization.
At the same time, Prime Minister Gandhi set her country on a road towards
increased government regulation and expanded economic subsidies.41 I argue in this
section that, in keeping with the theory’s expectations, these economic benefits were
distributed by national party leaders and indeed by Gandhi herself. Gone were the days
of independently powerful party officials distributing economic benefits through a
national logroll. Under Indira Gandhi, it was the prime minister and her immediate
associates who controlled the patronage of the state, distributing it strategically and
unevenly to encourage support and to punish opposition.
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The Independent Variable:
Centralization of the Indian National Congress
While Prime Minister Gandhi made some efforts to centralize power before the
famous Congress split, it was only after she had broken with the party’s entrenched
bosses that she could truly dominate the party apparatus. In 1969, a brewing dispute
between Gandhi and the party’s organizational leadership, often termed the Syndicate,
came to a head over the election of the Indian President. After trading a series of
recriminations with members of the Syndicate, the prime minister and her supporters in
parliament separated from the party’s organizational leaders and claimed the mantle of
the Congress for themselves. From 1969, power in Indira Gandhi’s Congress, termed the
Congress (R) and later the Congress (I), was concentrated in her hands and in the hands
of her closest associates.42 This centralization of control was further expanded after the
prime minister’s triumphant 1971 election victory, in which she secured fully 67.9% of
seats in the Lok Sabha, performing significantly better than had the united Congress in
1967.43 By contrast, the branch of the Congress dominated by the Syndicate, the
Congress (O), performed quite poorly. No longer dependent on the communists, the
Syndicate, or the Congress left-wing for her position, Indira Gandhi exercised a level of
power that her father never could have imagined.
No doubt thinking of her recent confrontation with the Syndicate, Gandhi moved
quickly after the split to establish her control over the Congress (R).44 Never again would
the prime minister allow herself to be challenged by independently powerful party leaders
at the apex of the Congress. To that end, she ensured that all Congress presidents would

19

be close associates and unlikely to criticize her openly. Indeed, after her strength was
reinforced by the successful 1971 elections, Gandhi made sure that holders of that high
office would have no political base and would be totally dependent on her largess.
Further, to prevent any future Congress president from transforming the position into a
source of independent power, Prime Minister Gandhi ensured that no one would hold the
office for long. Five different individuals held the presidency between 1969 and 1975.45
In 1972, the prime minister pushed one of her closest associates, Jagjivan Ram, out of the
Congress presidency and replaced him with D. Sanjivayya, a party leader with no
independent base. Although Ram had proven his loyalty during the Congress split, Indira
Gandhi very likely perceived his strong base among scheduled castes as a threat.46
With her control of the Congress presidency ensured, Gandhi could select onehalf of the members of the Congress Working Committee quite directly. She also
exercised great influence over the remaining members, who were elected by the AICC,
by regulating the selection of candidates.47 With the CWC in her pocket, Gandhi was
also in effective control over its associated organizations, including the CEC. She used
her power over the party’s apex bodies to turn the organization on its head.
Under Nehru, officials at each level of the Congress organization had derived
much of their power from the primary membership and from the lower levels of the party
hierarchy. By contrast, Prime Minister Gandhi adopted the practice of using the powers
of the CEC and the Parliamentary Board (another party institution involved in candidate
selection) to appoint members of Pradesh Congress Committees by fiat. These members
would be personally loyal to the prime minister, and would generally not have an
independent power base that could challenge her in the future. The centrally-appointed
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PCCs would in turn often be charged with selecting members of the DCCs who fit the
same criteria. PCCs that opposed or threatened her Indira Gandhi would simply dissolve
and replace with ad hoc bodies that operated under her personal direction.
In a further sign of the centralization of the party, the Congress president assumed
the authority to nominate two representatives on every Congress Committee.48 As a
result, Prime Minister Gandhi was able to place supporters directly at every level of the
party organization. Her control over the Congress apparatus was finally complete when
Gandhi and her Congress president postponed the 1970 party elections and suspended
those scheduled for 1972. Indira Gandhi had transformed a party organization that had
derived its power from the political base into a top-down institution, and she had done it
without changing the letter of the party constitution.49
In addition to expanding her control over the new Congress Party organization,
Prime Minister Gandhi moved to dominate the process of selecting candidates for the
Lok Sabha. As we have already discussed, in Nehru’s time, the Central Election
Committee had generally allowed bodies at the state level to select candidates, only
intervening in the decisions of faction-ridden states. By contrast, Gandhi used the CEC
to, as Stanley Kochanek put it, “restructure state legislative elites from above.”50
Through the CEC and the Parliamentary Board, the prime minister appointed and
removed state chief ministers and members of Pradesh Congress Committees and
Pradesh Election Committees. She refused to re-nominate state politicians whom she
opposed, replacing them with politicians selected for their loyalty to the prime minister
rather than their base in the state.51 On the eve of her success in the state elections of
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1972, for example, Gandhi forced out the powerful chief ministers of Andhra Pradesh,
Assam, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan.52
Because the Congress Party dominated Indian politics, its centralized structure
was grafted onto the government. Without any visible changes in form, the same federal
and state institutions that had functioned with significant independence under Nehru
became vassals of the new prime minister. The increased role of the central government
and the prime minister vis-à-vis the states is indicated by a decrease in the number of
voters who, when polled, could name their chief ministers.53 Further, in those states
where factional conflict prevented the establishment of a stable government, or where
non-Congress parties held sway, Indira Gandhi often exercised “President’s rule,”
assuming direct control over state governments. Nehru and Shastri (Indira Gandhi’s
immediate predecessor) had resorted to President’s rule only ten times during their
tenures in office, whereas Indira Gandhi (plus the 1977-80 Janata government) made use
of it fully seventy-two times.54
The impact of a centralized Congress on the functioning of government was also
manifested in Gandhi’s strengthening of the prime minister’s personal secretariat and in
her constant reshuffling of the cabinet. Perhaps the most well-known example of this
approach was the prime minister’s removal of her most senior supporters Y. B. Chavan,
Jagjivan Ram, Swaran Singh, and F. A. Ahmed from their strong positions in the
ministries.55 After her confrontation with the Syndicate over the Indian presidency,
Prime Minister Gandhi also ensured that whoever held that exalted office was clearly
under her influence. In 1974, she prevented V. V. Giri from serving a second term, and
instead appointed her supporter F. A. Ahmed to become President.56
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Examining the Causal Linkages:
Did Party Centralization drive Economic Patronage Distribution?

The centralized character of Indira Gandhi’s Congress helped determine, I argue,
the allocation of economic benefits in India. Indira Gandhi, at the apex of the Congress
“pyramid”, had personal access to extensive sources of patronage, which she distributed
strategically to build and maintain support from key groups in her unwieldy electoral
coalition.57 As a result, I argue, economic patronage, including government finance and
industrial licenses, were less evenly distributed under Gandhi than they had been under
her father.

Industrial Licensing
Indira Gandhi’s centralized use of economic patronage was reflected in her
increased control over industrial licenses. In 1969, the prime minister leveraged a new
law, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP), into greater powers
over private industry. Further, in stark contrast to Nehru, she centered decision-making
for major industrial license requests in a special cabinet committee, ensuring that each
application would require her personal approval.
Prime Minister Gandhi’s centralized control over the Congress Party allowed her
to dictate industrial licensing decisions from her office. She had little fear that lower
echelons of the party would object to her new powers. While Nehru had played little role
in allocating industrial licenses, Indira Gandhi ensured that no major projects could be
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approved without her personal agreement. Under the MRTP, a committee of ministerial
representatives would review the license applications of large business houses. Any
proposals that the committee approved it would send to the Ministry of Industrial
Development, while any questionable or complex proposals it would forward to a semiindependent Monopolies Commission.58 In reality, however, decision-making had
become so political that the Commission was often shut out of the process. In 1972, its
members complained to the Parliament:
The Commission cannot help feeling that there is some incongruity in that
sometimes cases not involving any major issue were referred to the Commission
while other which would prima facie involve important considerations are not so
referred.59
From 1970, the ultimate decision-making authority over industrial licenses lay neither
with the Monopolies Commission nor with the ministries, but with the prime minister and
her secretariat. The secretariat had been created by Shastri to strengthen his hand in
dealing with the party organization, and it was beholden only to the prime minister.60
Under Indira Gandhi, it took on a new identity as the center of power in the Indian
government. As long-time civil servant Nitish Sengupta put it:
Interestingly, PM’s secretariat became a miniature central secretariat. Some of
the Joint Secretaries or even Deputy Secretaries would only deal with the
Ministers or Secretaries of other departments and would zealously guard their
authority. The PM’s secretariat became, for all practical purposes, the most
important Ministry in the Government of India between 1970 and 1977. It had
the power to veto any proposed activity.61

All major applications had to be forwarded to the Cabinet Committee on Economic
Coordination, a body chaired by Gandhi and essentially a part of her office.62 Nitish
Sengupta wrote:
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No worthwhile project could be cleared without the prime minister’s approval.
Those who managed to get industrial licenses also managed to see to it that others
did not. This was done by money, influence, and political muscle power.63
Industrial licenses had become, at least in part, an instrument of patronage to be doled out
by the prime minister to shore up her political position.
While Nehru and Shastri had presided over a decentralized system where
numerous firms and officials bargained over license allocation, Gandhi was able to target
approvals strategically to build support.64 Gandhi’s centralization of the industrial
licensing system was reflected in an uneven distribution of approvals across India’s
federal states. It was also apparent in the relationship between licensing decisions and
the Congress Party’s national political interest.
That licensing decisions were guided by political and strategic considerations
under Indira Gandhi is indicated in Figure 1. In this figure, I group India’s federal states
into three categories – those that gave the Congress Party weak electoral support (less
that 45% of votes), those that gave it moderate support (between 45% and 55% of votes),
and those that gave it strong support (over 55% of votes).65 For the earlier period, I
measure a state’s electoral support for the Congress using its Lok Sabha vote in the 1962
general election; for the later period, I use the state’s Lok Sabha vote in the 1971 general
election.66 The blue bars represent the average number of industrial licenses received
per capita by states in each group in 1965, while the red bars represent the licenses
received per capita in 1974-75.

Insert Figure 1
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The results show that the distribution of industrial licenses was more uneven
during the Indira Gandhi period (represented by the red bars) than during the Nehru
period67 (represented by the blue bars).68 Moreover, the data indicate that, under Indira
Gandhi, a state’s relative support for the Congress Party was likely to influence its receipt
of industrial licenses. It appears that Prime Minister Gandhi strategically approved more
licenses to states where support for the Congress was marginal, likely hoping to win them
over for the next election.69 By contrast, states where Congress support was weak and
states where it was strong received fewer licenses. The prime minister likely reasoned
that changes in patronage allocation would probably not alter the voting behavior of these
states significantly.70 In other words, the data indicate that, under a centralized Congress,
industrial licenses were distributed strategically to benefit the national electoral ambitions
of the party. By contrast, the data do not support such a clear motivation for licensing
decisions under a decentralized Congress.

Highlighting Causality:
Party Centralization and Financial Disbursements
The prime minister’s centralized control of the Congress party also allowed
significant influence over the distribution of government monies channeled through two
key institutions – the Planning Commission and the nationalized banks.
When, in the summer of 1969, Indira Gandhi nationalized India’s fourteen largest
private banks, she took one of the most far-reaching economic policy decisions of her
tenure as prime minister. Most observers attribute the proximate cause of Gandhi’s
decision to her ongoing feud with the Syndicate; the prime minister calculated correctly
that bank nationalization would buttress her political support among the Indian masses
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and the left parties. Also important, I believe, was the potential for patronage generation
that centralized control over India’s credit markets could afford.
With nationalization, representatives of the Congress Party were placed onto the
governing boards of commercial banks, and non-market criteria made their way into
allocative decisions. Because Gandhi exercised highly centralized control over the
Congress Party, she was able to intervene in investment decisions through these
representatives. Gandhi and her associates used this new source of patronage to win the
backing of Indian industrial and farming interests, providing loans at low interest rates to
supporters.
In addition, Indira Gandhi made use of the significant allocative discretion
enjoyed by the government to leverage some Planning Commission disbursements into
political capital. During Gandhi’s tenure as prime minister, distributional decisions under
the Planning Commission were determined in part by the Gadgil formula. This formula,
developed and implemented under the old, decentralized Congress Party, identified a
series of criteria (for example population and income) to be used when deciding on
planning outlays to each federal state.71 After centralizing the Congress Party, Gandhi
continued to adhere to this formula, perhaps because it contained sufficient ambiguities to
afford her significant control over the recipients of government rupees. It remained
largely within the prime minister’s purview, for example, to determine which states
needed extra federal funds for “special needs” or “special problems.”
The political targeting of plan transfers under Indira Gandhi is indicated in Figure
2. The blue bars show financial disbursements to the states under Nehru’s Second Five
Year Plan, whereas the red bars show disbursements under Gandhi’s Fourth Five Year
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Plan. As expected, transfers under the Second Plan are distributed fairly evenly,
regardless of a state’s level of support for the Congress Party. By contrast, transfers
under the Fourth Plan appear more targeted towards strengthening the party’s position in
marginal states.

Insert Figure 2

Conclusions
In this paper, I have argued that the organization of the Congress Party has been
among the most important determinants of economic patronage distribution in India.
During the Nehru period, the decentralized nature of the Congress Party led to fierce
bargaining among influential state and local leaders over the allocation of economic
benefits under the Second Five Year Plan. The distribution of these benefits was
determined through a vast national logroll, leading, I contend, to an even distribution of
licensing and state finance relative to what would come later. Immediately after the
party’s dramatic 1969 split, Indira Gandhi centralized the new Congress under her
personal control. She strategically distributed patronage to key industries and
constituencies, eliminating the vast logrolls and complex bargains of the Nehru era. The
increasingly uneven distribution of license allocation and government finance during this
period supports the argument.
What does the Indian case tell us about the role of political party organization in
influencing the distribution of economic patronage? Most other domestic institutions,
including those highlighted by the literature as determinants of government largess, did
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not vary enough across the Nehru and Indira Gandhi eras to reasonably explain the
economic shifts. The evidence, I believe, indicates clearly that the centralization of the
Congress Party was the driving force behind the observed changes in patronage
distribution. That is not to say that other explanations might not matter in a different
context; they very likely would. Rather, it is to emphasize the vital impact that party
organization can have in determining who gets economic benefits and who is left in the
cold. In fact, the importance of party organization in the Indian case provides evidence
that it is a sufficient, although probably not necessary, condition for shifts in patronage
distribution. As such, I believe that the organization of parties should be counted among
the key political determinants of the economic behavior of democracies.
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Figure 1:
Industrial License Allocation to the States
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NB: Only one state was classified as giving the Congress "strong support" for the 1965 data series.
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Figure 2:
Plan Transfers to the States
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NB: Only one state was classified as giving the Congress "strong support" for the 1965 data series.
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